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I was fortunate to have Dr. Tom Regan as one of the professors for the defense 
of my doctoral dissertation.  He noted that no one had, as yet, offered the 
following critique of his work. 
 
In The Case for Animal Rights (1984) Tom Regan explains his 
philosophical defense of animal rights, commonly termed “The Rights View.”  In 
the process, he defines “innocent threats” as dangerous moral patients; he 
defines moral patients as inherently innocent.  He asserts that protecting those 
who are morally innocent always takes precedence over those who are not 
morally innocent.  This assertion has interesting implications for Regan’s work, 
which have not previously been explored to the best of my knowledge. 
By Regan’s account, a small child flinging poisonous darts randomly into a 
crowd would be an innocent threat.  When an innocent threat endangers others it 
may be necessary to harm the innocent to avoid endangering or destroying 
others.  Regan uses the example of a rabid dog and a rabid fox, indicating that in 
either case one might “harm” dangerous yet innocent non-human animals in 
order to nullify such a threat (Case 296, 353).   
 Regan writes, if rabid foxes have “bitten some children and are known to 
be in the neighboring woods...  and if the circumstances of their lives assure 
future attacks if nothing is done, then the Rights View sanctions nullifying the 
threat posed by these animals” (Case 353).  Regan does not explain “nullify,” but 
historically speaking to nullify the threat of a rabid fox is to kill the fox.  It would 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 2
appear that the Rights View permits innocent threats to be eliminated for the 
sake of human protection (Case 353). 
 While the basic principle (allowing self-defense against innocent threats) 
seems reasonable, Regan fails to define the borders of such aggressive 
protective measures.  Without limitations on what constitutes a “legitimate” threat, 
and in the absence of limits on the measures one may take in the name of self-
defense, Regan’s innocent threat clause could culminate in undesirable 
consequences.   
 For example, moose roam backyards, city streets, and recreational areas 
in Anchorage, Alaska.  Every year moose stomp people to death in fenced yards, 
on ski-trails, and sometimes on the main university campus.  Everyone knows 
that dangerous encounters with moose will occur in the future, and that some 
such encounters will result in the death of human beings.  On the basis of likely 
future endangerment as outlined by Regan (with regard to rabid fox) killing such 
possibly dangerous moose in Anchorage is also acceptable because moose 
constitute an “innocent threat.”  Similarly, grizzly bears sometimes attack and kill 
hikers on trails around Anchorage. The only way to prevent such incidents is to 
eliminate bears.  (In most of the world, that is exactly what people have done, 
whether by design or simply through persistence.)  Therefore, according to 
Regan’s “Rights View’ bears around Anchorage, like moose, ought to be 
eliminated as a necessary protection under Regan’s “innocent-threats” clause.   
 If we extrapolate from Regan’s rabid fox example, taking this idea to its 
logical extreme, all moose and bear might justifiably be killed because they are 
always and everywhere innocent threats.  The farther back into the wild country 
human beings venture, the more likely it becomes that people will encounter 
“dangerous” animals, and the more likely it becomes that human lives will be lost.  
In Regan’s view it is legitimate to “nullify” such innocent threats.  Ultimately, if 
taken to its extreme, all dangerous wild animals might be eradicated, including 
rattlesnakes, polar bear, black widow spiders, cougar—and many others.   
 If we are to be impartial, and to maintain consistency, as the Western 
philosophic tradition insists, Regan’s allowance for innocent threats might also 
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endanger the lives of many people.  Although Regan’s discussion of “innocent 
threats” deals with situations where moral patients harm moral agents, he offers 
no indication that the same would not be true in the opposite situation.  
Humans—more than any other animal—pose a danger to innocent others, and 
people are often ignorant of the damage they do; such dangerous people 
therefore qualify as innocent threats.   
For instance, the vast majority of Western hunters kill for recreation.  They 
kill because they consider hunting a worthwhile and enjoyable way to spend 
time—and because they do not acknowledge (or even consider) that killing 
animals for food is completely unnecessary for human survival, and that such 
“sport” causes tremendous hardship and harm to other living beings.  (In fact, 
hunters usually assert that they do their victims a favor by preventing 
overpopulation!)  Thus hunters needlessly endanger and destroy thousands of 
animals every year, and may be said to do so innocently (out of ignorance).   
Regan’s “innocent threats” clause justifies the killing of rabid fox that might 
bite (out of fear or in self-defense), and also the killing of ignorant—and therefore 
innocent—human beings that slaughter deer.  To eliminate other species when 
they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in comparable 
situations, is inconsistent.  Are we not equally morally obliged to defend the 
hunted from ignorant (and therefore innocent) yet dangerous hunters?  According 
to Regan’s Rights View, the answer seems to be “yes.” 
There are yet other intriguing possibilities.  Regan asserts that one who 
has lost their innocence through unjust actions has forfeited their equal inherent 
value (Case 323).  While those who have lost their innocence in such a manner 
still ought to be treated with respect (are still due just treatment), the injustices 
borne by unfortunate individuals grant those individuals privileges above those 
who perpetrate such injustices.   
In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan posits a lifeboat with four humans 
and one dog vying for space.  Regan concludes that the dog ought always and 
perpetually to go overboard (for various reasons which are not relevant to my 
point).  But this assertion does not seem consistent with Regan’s treatment 
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regarding loss of innocence.   
If consistently applied, how would Regan’s assertion of loss of innocence 
affect these hapless sea-bound citizens?  Regan accuses those who buy and 
consume flesh of being immoral—of sacrificing innocent lives for no good reason.  
He states: “those who support current animal agriculture by purchasing meat 
have a moral obligation to stop doing so” (Case 394).  It is reasonable to assume 
that Regan would make a similar assertion about any common yet unnecessary 
human exploitation of non-human animals, from attending circuses to buying 
cosmetics tested on animals.   
Determining “loss of innocence” would require that human beings be 
scrutinized in order to discover whether or not they have exploited other-than-
human animals.  Flesh and dairy-eaters, leather and fur-wearers, and those who 
have used other subjects-of-a-life for science projects—as well as any and all 
individuals who support these actions—have jeopardized their otherwise equal 
right not to be harmed.  If even one of the humans on the lifeboat has been 
eating bits of bodies from innocent moral patients, each of whom share equal 
inherent value and the equal right not to be harmed in Regan’s philosophy, the 
dog will not be thrown overboard according to Regan’s Rights View.  On the 
contrary: loss of innocence amongst at least one of the four life-boat clinging 
humans is almost certain.  Consequently, according to Regan’s views with regard 
to “loss of innocence” the dog is the least likely to be thrown overboard.   
Furthermore, Regan clearly asserts that nonhuman animals are always 
innocent moral patients.  Consequently, dogs (birds, cats, snakes, and any other 
nonhuman animal) cannot jeopardize their chance for a spot on the lifeboat while 
humans will almost surely be guilty of treating other animals as if they did not 
have equal inherent value—thereby forfeiting their place on the raft.  According to 
Regan only nonhuman passengers are incapable of forfeiting their rights 
because they are inherently innocent.  For the dog to go overboard, as Regan 
suggests, the humans must have a spotless record with regard to their treatment 
of nonhuman life.  This seems highly unlikely. 
In any and all scenarios humans are likely to have jeopardized their 
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innocence in relation to—and with regard to—other species, while other-than-
human animals remain inherently innocent in Regan’s Rights View.  Contrary to 
Regan’s conclusion, if members of the lifeboat are chucked overboard one by 
one—the survivor will almost surely be the dog.   
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